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This paper considers vertical price relationships between wholesalers and retailers on five local
maize markets in Benin. We show that the common stochastic trend and the long-run disequilibrium
error must explicitly be considered to correctly interpret the restrictions on the error–correction
structure in terms of economic power in the channel. Interesting differences between markets are
found. In the two major towns, retailers play a more prominent role in the price formation process
than generally assumed in the literature on development economics. In the two larger rural centers,
however, wholesalers involved in arbitrage among urban markets do influence price formation.
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1. Introduction
In the literature on industrial organization, retail prices are often assumed to be
determined by wholesale market conditions (see, for example, Tirole, 1988, Chapter 4;
Martin, 1993, Chapter 12). Likewise, in the marketing literature on the functioning of
food markets in tropical countries, the vertical price leadership of wholesalers is often
conjectured but not empirically tested. In contrast to the vertical case, much empirical0304-3878/03/$ - see front matter D 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0304-3878(03)00035-X
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countries is available (e.g., Ravallion, 1986; Baulch, 1997; Badiane and Shively, 1998;
Kuiper et al., 1999; Abdulai, 2000). Most studies on spatial price linkages focus on two
issues: are markets integrated and are prices dominated by a central market? Most results
confirm that markets are competitive and integrated, although less than perfect. Trans-
action costs hamper market integration and not all spot markets perform equally well.
Moreover, as Baulch (1997; pp. 478–479) rightly points out, ‘‘market integration does
not itself, however, imply that food markets are competitive. The spatial arbitrage
conditions are also consistent with such oligopolistic pricing practices as basing point
pricing (Faminow and Benson, 1990)’’. Consequently, tests for market integration should
also be accompanied by an investigation of the wholesale–retail price relationship in
order to assess the power of wholesalers being involved in spatial arbitrage. Accord-
ingly, we want to draw attention to the wholesale–retail price relationship. Can we find
evidence for vertical price leadership of wholesalers or do they lack the market power to
impose prices on local retailers? To put it differently, can we find some empirical
support for the popular complaints regularly expressed by retailers and local market
authorities about the market power of wholesalers?
Looking at the Benin maize market, Lutz (1994) found that retail and wholesale
price series in the same market place cohere, which implies that retail margins are
stationary. This result suggests that retailers are indeed passive decision makers,
following wholesale prices without taking local supply and demand conditions into
account. However, other evidence provided by a survey among traders does not
support this conclusion and shows that a large number of wholesalers supply the urban
market from different surplus regions, while urban retailers actively search for whole-
salers proposing the lowest price (Lutz, 1994). Moreover, in rural areas retailers can
choose to buy either from wholesalers or at the farm gate. Buying directly from
farmers may provide retailers some freedom to set prices. Consequently, it is not a
clear matter whether wholesalers or retailers or both have some market power and are
able to influence price formation.
In an earlier study on price arbitrage in the wholesale segment of the maize market, we
concluded that all wholesale markets played a role in the price formation process (Kuiper
et al., 1999). None of the price series of any of the wholesale markets were found to be
dominant: all price series were interdependent. The arbitrage process corresponded to a
network with a number of interdependent wholesale markets; there were no autarkic
markets and transportation costs did not show a stochastic trend. The study, however, did
not incorporate the price series observed on the retail segments. In the present paper we
focus on this omission, questioning the relationship between prices in wholesale and retail
market segments in various markets for the same sample period as in Kuiper et al. (1999).
The questions we set out to answer are: is there a difference in wholesale–retail price
relationships in towns and rural centers, and is there any evidence for wholesale market
dominance vis-a`-vis the retailers?
Most studies on vertical price relationships published to date in marketing and
industrial organization (see, for example, Gerstner and Hess, 1991; Lee and Staelin,
1997 and the references they cite) have used comparative statics to study channel
behavior; the long-run relationships derived have not been empirically tested. Our
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the price formation process is driven by retailers, wholesalers, or both, we can
distinguish two segments in the market: the retail segment and the wholesale segment.
We assume that actors in both segments try to maximize profits. To examine whether
or not wholesalers are price leader vis-a`-vis the retailers in the sense of Stackelberg
leadership, one can consider the long-run equilibrium (i.e., cointegrating) relationship
between the wholesale and retail prices and test whether or not wholesale prices and
retail prices respond to deviations from the equilibrium price.
The basic assumption we make is that the common stochastic trend observed in the
cointegrated wholesale–retail price series is generated by local supply and demand
conditions (seasonal price trend). Three models then become interesting for the study
of price adjustment: Model 1 in which both retailers and wholesalers have some
freedom to respond to deviations from the equilibrium price; Model 2 in which only
retailers have the power to respond to deviations from the equilibrium price; and
Model 3 in which only wholesalers have the freedom to respond to deviations from the
equilibrium price.
In Model 1, wholesalers have sufficient power vis-a`-vis the retailers to behave as
vertical price leaders, although retailers can still maximize their profits dependent on
the wholesale price being set by the wholesalers. This model applies if both retail and
wholesale traders exercise some market power, for example, if alternative market
opportunities exist for both actors. In contrast, in Model 2 the retailers do not allow
wholesalers to influence short-run retail price deviations and leave them with only the
option of setting wholesale prices on the basis of the wholesalers’ unit costs (i.e., farm
gate price plus a margin to enable the wholesaler to survive), which represents the
common stochastic trend that drives the two prices, the retail price and the wholesale
price, in the long run. Market power for retailers may be the result of a temporarily
abundant supply in the wholesale segment and a lack of alternative market oppor-
tunities for wholesalers. Lastly, in Model 3, only wholesalers are able to set their prices
in the sense of Stackelberg leadership and to respond to price deviations from the
equilibrium. The situation applying in this model is one in which large numbers of
retailers buy from farmers and wholesalers to serve local consumers, whereas the local
wholesalers are also involved in regional market arbitrage and ship to urban markets.
Consequently, the retail price is getting stuck to the common stochastic trend from
which the wholesale price can deviate in the short run by price arbitrage among the
spatially dispersed wholesale markets.
In deriving the testable implications of the hypotheses about economic power in
marketing channels, we explicitly take the common stochastic trend and the deviations
from the long-run vertical price equilibrium into account. This is the major contribution
of our paper to the debate on vertical price leadership and we will show that if the
common stochastic trend and disequilibrium error are not explicitly assigned to certain
variables in the channel model, one can easily be wrong about how restrictions on the
error–correction model must be interpreted in terms of vertical price leadership.
Furthermore, since we wish to test between the three theoretical models outlined
above, another important advantage of our empirical method is that it nests these tests
in one procedure.
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in the south of Benin: two towns (Bohicon and Cotonou) and three rural centers
(Azove´, Dassa and Ke´tou). Section 2 discusses the relevance of the three above-
mentioned models. In Section 3, the method of analysis is presented. We formulate the
long-run model and derive its testable implications on the short-run price system.
Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 the conclusions.2. Relevance of the market models distinguished
The market for maize, the staple food crop in the south of Benin, consists of a
number of market places, scattered throughout the region. Most transactions take place
in spot markets; buyers and sellers meet in the market place where the maize for sale
is displayed on the market day. Maize is transferred from producers to final consumers
through conventional marketing channels, where more or less homogenous products are
traded between actors who are not involved in recurrent trade relationships. In each
market place, a retail and a wholesale segment can be distinguished. In the large
towns, local retailers generally buy in the wholesale segment of the market, while
retailers in rural centers can choose to obtain their stocks either from the wholesale
segment or directly at the farm gate.
Cotonou (Dantokpa) and Bohicon are two important urban markets in the country. Both
market places are centers for retail trade. As urban price levels are relatively high, supply
in the local wholesale segment is directed to serving only local retail demand. Sometimes
wholesalers organize themselves in order to address specific problems. However, because
of the large number of wholesalers and brokers active in the market, there are no
enforcement mechanisms to control entry or prices. Moreover, the wholesalers originate
from all regions in the country, which means that they have no real common interest.
Consequently, entry into the wholesale market-segment is free (Lutz, 1994). On the other
hand, for retailers entry is constrained by a lack of space on the market: most retailers have
a permanent place. Retailers try to tie clients by selling on credit and by negotiating the
amounts per unit of measurement. Apparently, retailers have some freedom to deviate from
equilibrium prices. Based on the literature we were inclined to expect Model 3 to simulate
wholesaler–retailer relationships. However, based on our observation that a large number
of wholesalers supply the wholesale market segment in the towns and that there is some
room for monopolistic competition among the retailers, we argue that also Model 2 can
hold for both Cotonou and Bohicon.
Important surpluses of maize are traded from Azove´ and Dassa to the two towns.
Consequently, the wholesalers in these rural markets are involved in regional market
arbitrage, and hence anticipate supply and demand conditions in the different, but
spatially price-integrated, wholesale markets. On both markets a large number of
retailers are found. They buy directly from farmers that supply early in the morning a
part of their surplus to the wholesale segment (they need money to finance that days’
purchases on the market), or buy from local wholesalers. From these observations our
empirical results with respect to Azove´ and Dassa are expected to be in line with the
assumptions made in the literature and to comply with Model 3.
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wholesale market segment, a relatively large number of local wholesalers sell to
nonresident urban wholesalers, in particular from Cotonou. Wholesalers in Ke´tou do
not have a local alternative for the demand from Cotonou, because there are very few
retailers in Ke´tou (approximately five per market day), who mainly buy at the farm
gate. The local retail market is thin, as most residents buy directly from farmers or are
farmers themselves. However, some local consumers depend on the market in Ke´tou.
This implies that the small number of retailers may exercise some monopolistic
behavior. Therefore, Model 2 can be expected to be the most appropriate for describing
the situation.3. Method
3.1. Theoretical framework
Let us consider a two-stage channel with M (Mz 1) wholesalers upstream and N
(Nz 1) retailers downstream (MVN). We model the long-run supply decision behavior
of these channel members. During the period covered by one time series observation t
(e.g., a day in case of daily observations), each wholesaler j ( j = 1,. . .,M) exclusively
supplies Mj retailers (Mjz1^ N = Sj=1M Mj). The retailer buys an amount of qi
(i= 1,. . .,N) of an intermediate good from the wholesaler at a wholesale price pwi.
The wholesaler acquired the intermediate good at a constant unit cost pfi (the weighted
average of the farm gate price faced by the wholesaler with respect to qi) and
distributed it at a constant unit cost cwi. Retailer i faces constant unit retailing cost, cri,
and resells the product to the consumers at a price pri on the retail market. It is
assumed that the wholesalers and retailers do not throw away any of the intermediate
good. Consequently, the quantity purchased by the wholesalers is equal to the quantity
finally consumed.
Let the consumer behavior faced by retailer i be given by the following flexible inverse
demand function (see, e.g., Lilien and Kotler, 1983, p. 74):
pri ¼ siqdi þ xi; ð1Þ
where qi is the quantity sold by retailer i and si and xi capture exogenous shifts in the
demand curve and may also contain a constant term. In the sequel of this subsection, we
discuss the sign of d in relation to the values of si and xi.
We first consider the Stackelberg model in which the wholesalers are the vertical
price leaders, i.e., each retailer i maximizes profit conditional on the wholesale price
that has to be paid to the wholesaler, and the wholesaler then determines qi or,
similarly, pwi, by maximizing profit while taking the conditional profit-maximizing
behavior of retailer i into account. The conditional profit-maximization problem of
retailer i can be written as:
max
qi
ðpri  cri  pwiÞqi; ð2aÞ
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max
pri
ðpri  cri  pwiÞqi ð2bÞ
subject to Eq. (1). The first-order condition for this problem is:
pri  cri  pwi þ ðdpri=dqiÞqi ¼ 0; ð3aÞ
or equivalently,
qi þ ðdqi=dpriÞðpri  cri  pwiÞ ¼ 0: ð3bÞ
From each of both Eqs. (3a) and (3b) it follows that:
pwi ¼ ð1þ dÞpri  cri  dxi ð4Þ
Wholesaler j maximizes individual profit while taking the conditional profit-max-











ðpwk  cwk  pfkÞqk ; ð5bÞ
is subjected to Eq. (4) and has the following Mj first-order conditions:
pwk þ ðdpwk=dqkÞqk  cwk  pfk ¼ 0; ð6aÞ
or equivalently,
qk þ ðdqk=dpwkÞðpwk  cwk  pfkÞ ¼ 0 ð6bÞ
with k = 1,. . .,Mj. Using Eq. (4), from each of both Eqs. (6a) and (6b) we can derive
Mj linear combinations of the wholesale and retail prices without qk included:
pwk þ dð1þ dÞprk ¼ cwk þ pfk þ dð1þ dÞxk ð7Þ
Recall that N =Sj=1
M Mj. Consequently, the total number of relations given by Eq. (7)
equals N.
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prices, we obtain:
pw ¼ ð1þ dÞpr  cr  dx; ð8aÞ








































which shows that it is important to collect the data for each retail account instead of taking


















Solving Eqs. (8a) and (8b) for pr and pw gives:
pr ¼ ð1þ dÞ2ðcr þ cw þ pf þ ½ð1þ dÞ2  1xÞ ð9aÞ
pw ¼ ð1þ dÞ1ðcw þ pf  dcr þ dxÞ: ð9bÞ
In Eq. (9a), it can be seen that if { 1 < d< 0^si>0biaN}, then x has a negative impact on
pr which cannot be true according to Eq. (1). In contrast, Eq. (9a) implies a positive
relationship between x and pr if {d >0 ^si < 0^xi>0biaN}. Consequently, if { 1 < d <
0^si >0biaN}, then x must be equal to zero. In the next subsection, we address the ques-
tion how to empirically choose between { 1 < d < 0^si>0^xi = 0biaN} and {d>0^si<
0^xi>0biaN}.
Returning to the issue of vertical price interaction, it is interesting to observe that if
prices are set according to Eqs. (9a) and (9b), then the wholesalers have enough power
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the retailers dominate, then we may have a situation in which each retailer maximizes
profit and forces the wholesaler to set prices on the basis of total unit costs alone,
leading to the following expression in weighted averages:
pw ¼ cw þ pf : ð10Þ
So far, two models have been considered: the model made up by Eqs. (9a) and (9b),
Model 1, according to which the wholesaler is able to manipulate the retail price by
dpwk/dqk in Eq. (6a) (or, similarly, by dqk/dpw in Eq. (6b)), and the model formed by
Eqs. (8a) and (10), Model 2, which says that the retailers dominate. In addition, a third
model, Model 3, is obtained if we assume that the retailer is able to buy directly from
the farmer (there is no wholesaler in between) and set pr on the basis of pf as follows:
pr ¼ ð1þ dÞ1ðcw þ pf Þ ð11Þ
under the restrictions { 1 < d < 0^si>0^xi= 0biaN}, where cw is added to cover the
costs that would otherwise be made by the wholesaler. Competition among the retailers
imposes the restrictions {cri = 0biaN} and forces them to charge a price that is not
different from the one set by Eq. (11). Nevertheless, in spite of the retailer’s ability to
buy directly from the farmer, the retailer can also buy from the wholesaler while
having pr still determined by Eq. (11). Although the wholesaler is not able to influence
the local retail market because pr is fixed by Eq. (11), the wholesaler can still
determine pw by Eq. (9b) if involved in market arbitrage, so that pw can be based on
the reaction function of retailers in other local markets that are unable to buy directly
from the farmer. The testable implications of the three models being considered will be
discussed in the next subsection.
3.2. Econometric considerations
Many economic time series, like prt and pwt (t = 0, 1,. . .,T), do not fluctuate around
a constant in a seemingly random way, but their first differences, Dprt = prt pr,t 1
and Dpwt= pwt pw,t 1, do (Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Granger and Newbold, 1986).
Consequently, the variables in levels, prt and pwt, are assumed to be nonstationary by
containing a unit root, while in first differences they will be stationary. In time series
analysis, this is expressed by saying that prt and pwt are integrated of order one,
denoted prtf I(1) and pwtf I(1), and Dprt and Dpwt are integrated of order zero,
denoted Dprtf I(0) and Dpwtf I(0).
The nonstationarity in case of a unit root is caused by a so-called ‘stochastic trend’
(Banerjee et al., 1993, p. 153), which can be interpreted as the driving force of the
variable. If two variables are driven by the same stochastic trend, then a linear combination
of the two will be stationary, which is expressed by saying that the two variables are
‘cointegrated’ (Engle and Granger, 1987) or, equivalently, have a ‘common stochastic
trend’ (Stock and Watson, 1988).
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enter the price system derived from Eq. (1): xt, crt, and cwt+ pft. For now we simply
assume that xt and crt do not contain a stochastic trend of importance when compared
with the stochastic trend generated by the prices of the raw product as represented by
the farm gate price pft. Consequently, we assume that cwt + pft introduces the stochastic
trend in the price system, expressing local supply and demand conditions and seasonal
factors. In the empirical analysis, the stationarity assumption of xt and crt is tested by
the concept of cointegration.
To illustrate the relationship between the concept of a stochastic trend and the concept
of cointegration, let us consider the retail price prt and the wholesale price pwt in a vector
autoregression of order k, denoted VAR(k), as follows:
DXt ¼ Xt1 þ
Xk1
j¼1
jDXtj þDt þ et ð12Þ
where Xt=[ prt, pwt]Vf I(1), DXt=XtXt 1, the / and &j ( j = 1,. . .,k 1) are (2	 2)
parameter matrices, % is a (2	m) parameter matrix, Dt is a (m	 1) vector with
deterministic elements, et=[ert, ewt]V are disturbances that follow a two-dimensional
Gaussian white noise process, and the values of X k + 1,. . .,X0 are fixed. Notice that
there can never be a relationship between a variable with a stochastic trend and a
variable without a stochastic trend. So, if DXtf I(0) since Xtf I(1) (and hence,
Xt 1f I(1)), then / will be a zero matrix except when a linear combination of the
variables in Xt is stationary, i.e., when prt and pwt are cointegrated (or when one of
the prices is stationary so that we should also test for the absence of each individual
price in the cointegrating relation to justify our assumption that both prices are I(1)).
Because this linear combination is unique, the rank of / will be equal to one, i.e.,
rank(/) = 1. Hence, rank(/) = 0 if there is no cointegration and rank(/) = 2 if
Xtf I(0). The Johansen procedure (for example, Johansen and Juselius, 1990;
Johansen, 1995) estimates the parameters in Eq. (12); to test for cointegration, trace
statistics are used to determine the rank of /, and asymptotic t-statistics are used to
test for the absence of each individual price in the cointegrating relationship, in order
to check whether both price series are I(1).
Clearly, the result of interest will be rank(/) = 1. In this case / can be decomposed
into / =abV, where a=[ar, aw]V is the adjustment vector and b=[br, bw]V is the
cointegrating vector, so that Eq. (12) becomes a vector error–correction model (VECM):
DXt ¼ abVXt1 þ
Xk1
j¼1
jDXtj þDt þ et ð13Þ
where bVXtf I(0) and represents the deviations from the long-run equilibrium, that is,
cointegrating, relationship between prt and pwt, and the changes in at least one of the
prices, DXt, respond to these deviations from the previous period, bVXt 1, through the
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converge to zero.
Premultiplying Eq. (13) by bVand rearranging, gives:
bVXt ¼ ð1þ bVaÞbVXt1 þ
Xk1
j¼1
bVjDXtj þ bVDt þ bVet: ð14Þ
Because DXt j ( j= 1,. . .,k 1) and et are stationary, the condition A1 +bVaA < 1, or
equivalently,  2 <bVa < 0, allows bVXt to be stationary as well. If we return to our
theoretical framework in the previous subsection, then given the assumption that xt and crt
are stationary, Eq. (8a) is the linear combination of prt and pwt in Model 1 that represents
bVXt: crt + dxt=(1 + d)prt pwt =bVXt. In Model 2, the cointegrating relationship is the
same one as in Model 1, but now pwt is given by Eq. (10) instead of Eq. (9b). Lastly, in
Model 3, substituting Eq. (11) for cwt+ pft in Eq. (9b) yields the following long-run
relationship between prt and pwt: (1 + d)
 1d*(crt* xt*) = prt (1 + d) 1(1 + d*)pwt, where
the terms with an * concern the retailers and inverse demand Eq. (1) with respect to the
urban market to which the wholesalers ship the surpluses. Notice that each time the
disequilibrium error consists of a linear combination of crt and xt. Hence, testing for
cointegration can be seen as a check of our assumption that crt and xt are stationary. In
addition, if the estimate of d complies with the restriction  1 < d < 0, then we may
consider xt to be equal to zero for all t= 0, 1,. . .,T.
The long-run equilibrium implies a common stochastic trend in the prices prt and pwt.
Following Bruneau and Jondeau (1999), the common stochastic trend is captured by one
of both variables in Xt if this variable does not respond to the error–correction term
bVXt 1 directly and indirectly by the DXt j ( j= 1,. . .,k 1) terms of the other variable
in Xt which, in turn, is error-correcting. This implies that the variable in Xt representing
the common stochastic trend is free from long-run causality by the other variable in Xt.
Returning to our theoretical framework in the previous subsection again, then given the
assumption that cwt + pft introduces the common stochastic trend, it follows that in Model
1, at least, if { 1 < d < 0^si>0^xi = 0biaN} apply, the common stochastic trend can
only be captured by a linear combination of both prices, prt and pwt, see Eq. (8b),
because according to Eqs. (9a) and (9b) both prt and pwt display error correction. In
contrast, in Model 2 the common stochastic trend is captured by pwt only, see Eq. (10),
whereas in Model 3 it is prt that solely represents the common stochastic trend, see Eq.
(11).
From the econometric concepts introduced above, we can now derive the testable
implications that discriminate between our three strategic channel pricing models:
Model 1, given by Eqs. (9a), (9b) and { 1 < d < 0^si>0^xi= 0biaN} and implying
price leadership of the wholesaler; Model 2, formed by Eqs. (9a) and (10) and
implying that the retailer dominates since the wholesaler is only allowed to set its price
on the basis of the farm gate price; and Model 3, composed of Eqs. (9b) and (11) to
capture the fact that the retailer buys directly from the farmer while the wholesaler is
involved in market arbitrage. According to Model 1 the common stochastic trend is
captured by a linear combination of both prices, prt and pwt. Consequently, at least one
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the error–correction term, then it will depend on one or more lagged values of the first
differences of the error-correcting price. In Model 2, pwt represents the common
stochastic trend. Hence, pwt does not display error–correction behavior, but prt does.
Conversely, in Model 3, it is prt that comes closest to the common stochastic trend and
therefore, in contrast to pwt, it does not show error correction.
Notice that these results are counter-intuitive when compared with the literature on spatial
(i.e., horizontal) price integration, where it is the price of the reference (i.e., dominant)
market that should not show error-correcting behavior (for example, Kuiper et al., 1999). On
the contrary, in our first two channel (i.e., vertical) pricing models,Models 1 and 2, the price
of the leader does respond to the error–correction term. This shows that it is important to
assign the common stochastic trend and the disequilibrium error to the respective variables
in the theoretical model (in our framework the stochastic trend is generated by cwt+ pft and
the disequilibrium error is introduced by crt and xt), before formulating hypotheses on price
dominance in terms of exclusion of the error–correction term.4. Empirical analysis
All five markets are periodic and are held once every 4 days. Daily wholesale and retail
prices are available for all five markets: for 190 market days at Cotonou (4 September
1987 to 29 September 1989), 160 market days at Bohicon (1 January 1988 to 29
September 1989), 184 market days at Azove´ (28 September 1987 to 29 September
1989), 174 market days at Dassa (3 November 1987 to 25 September 1989) and, lastly,
144 market days at Ke´tou (3 March 1988 to 25 September 1989). For each market, the
time series of the retail prices and wholesale prices are displayed in one figure, see Fig. 1
(data available from authors on request). See Lutz (1994) or Lutz et al. (1995) for a
description of the elaborate method used to collect these market prices. Annual inflation
was only 2–3% during the sample period and can be ignored when compared to the
stochastic trend fluctuations in the prices. Hence, the price series were not deflated.
Fig. 1 nicely shows the coherence between the wholesale and retail prices. Moreover,
the considerable price fall in 1988 clearly marks the end of the lean season after the
relatively bad harvest in 1987, and the start of a new promising harvest. Nevertheless, in
spite of this large price shock, the estimated breakpoint test statistic of Zivot and Andrews
(1992) does not reject I(1) against the alternative of single structural breakpoint
stationarity, see Table 1, although the test statistic for the wholesale price series of
Bohicon is just a bit smaller than the 5% critical value.
For each market, we considered the retail and wholesale prices and estimated bivariate
VARs of order k = 1,. . .,10. All computations were performed in EViews, Version 4. To
determine the order of the VAR, the Hannan–Quinn (HQ) and the Schwarz (SC) criteria
were computed. These criteria have proven to be consistent not only for stationary
processes, but also for nonstationary ones (see Lu¨tkepohl, 1991, and the references cited
therein). For each criterion, the estimate for k, denoted k*, was chosen so that the criterion
was minimized. For each market, k* was found to be equal to one when using the whole
sample (less the first 10 observations) and the last 100 observations of the sample (adding
Fig. 1. Prices in Fcfa per kilogram per day. Period between each daily observation is 3 days (markets are held in a
4-day cycle). Observation 1 represents date 9/4/87; observation 20 is date 11/19/87; observation 40 is date 2/7/88;
observation 60 is date 4/27/88; observation 80 is date 7/16/88; observation 100 is date 10/4/88; observation 120 is
date 12/23/88; observation 140 is date 3/13/89; observation 160 is date 6/1/89; observation 180 is date 8/20/89.
PRC: retail price Cotonou; PWC: wholesale price Cotonou; PRB: retail price Bohicon; PWB: wholesale price
Bohicon; PRA: retail price Azove´; PWA: wholesale price Azove´; PRD: retail price Dassa; PWD: wholesale price
Dassa; PRK: retail price Ke´tou; PWK: wholesale price Ke´tou.
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Consequently, k* is much smaller than the maximum lag length fixed at 10, suggesting
that it is unnecessary to conclude that it is more fruitful to increase the information set by
Table 1
Minimum t values for Model (A) with k¯= 8 obtained by applying the procedure of Zivot and Andrews (1992) to
test for I(1) against the alternative of single structural breakpoint I(0)
Series Minimum t value Date of breakpoint
Retail price Cotonou  3.42 6/30/88
Wholesale price Cotonou  3.69 6/30/88
Retail price Bohicon  3.96 7/04/88
Wholesale price Bohicon  4.83* 6/26/88
Retail price Azove´  3.97 6/22/88
Wholesale price Azove´  4.17 6/30/88
Retail price Dassa  4.30 7/12/88
Wholesale price Dassa  4.07 7/12/88
Retail price Ke´tou  4.24 6/30/88
Wholesale price Ke´tou  4.04 6/30/88
* and ** indicate that the I(1) hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Critical t values are
 4.80 (0.05 level) and  5.34 (0.01 level), see Zivot and Andrews (1992, Table 2).
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increase the lag length.
Next, we applied the Johansen procedure (Johansen, 1992) to jointly test for
cointegration and deterministic components, see also Harris (1995, p. 97). Again, to
assess the consistency of our results, we performed our analysis for the whole sample
(less the first 10 observations) and its last 100 observations. Both samples led to the
same conclusions. We found the wholesale price and the retail price to be cointegrated
for each market; this supports our assumption that the unit retailing cost crt and the
exogenous demand shifts captured by xt can be considered to be stationary. The results
are presented in Table 2 and are based on Eqs. (12) and (13). It appears that none of
the selected models contain deterministic terms. Comparing the trace statistics with
their critical values shows that for each market r = 0 (i.e., no cointegration) must be
rejected (which was true for all models for the deterministic components) while rV 1
(i.e., cointegration) cannot be rejected. In contrast to the widely used Engle–Granger
two-step method for cointegration testing (Engle and Granger, 1987), the Johansen
procedure is invariant to the choice of the variable selected for normalization
(Hamilton, 1994). In our presentation, we chose the retail price to be the left-hand
variable of the cointegrating relationship (ert is the disequilibrium error, see Table 2).
For each market place, we found the parameter of the wholesale price to be highly
significant (using asymptotic t-values). If we took the wholesale price as the left-hand
variable and estimated the parameter of the retail price, we found all parameters to be
significant as well. Consequently, both prices must be I(1) and their relationship is a
real cointegrating relationship, complying with our assumption that xt and crt are
stationary.
Based on the long-run parameter estimates presented in Table 2, we estimated the
short-run parameters of the VECM equations which consisted of a (we included an
unrestricted intercept in each regression as well) and not also of &j, because, as
mentioned before, the order of the VAR model was selected to be one for each
market. Therefore, the a parameters, which can be interpreted as adjustment
Table 2
Testing for cointegration among the retail price series and wholesale price series of the corresponding market
Market rV Trace 1 Cointegrating relationship
(standard error in parentheses)
Trace 2 Cointegrating relationship
(standard error in parentheses)
Cotonou 0 55.87* prt= 1.11pwt+ ert (0.01) 54.30* prt= 1.11pwt + ert (0.01)
1 0.44 0.06
Bohicon 0 44.96* prt= 1.07pwt + ert (0.01) 18.70* prt= 1.08pwt+ ert (0.01)
1 1.19 0.19
Azove´ 0 78.43* prt= 1.09pwt + ert (0.01) 56.61* prt= 1.11pwt + ert (0.01)
1 0.73 0.24
Dassa 0 67.76* prt= 1.18pwt + ert (0.01) 32.64* prt= 1.18pwt+ ert (0.01)
1 0.35 0.42
Ke´tou 0 61.79* prt= 1.02pwt + ert (0.01) 29.54* prt= 1.02pwt+ ert (0.02)
1 1.90 0.18
Trace 1 is the trace statistic computed for the whole sample less the first 10 observations and Trace 2 is the trace
statistic computed for the last effective 100 observations of the sample.
ert is the residual of the cointegrating relationship. The standard error in parentheses concerns the parameter of the
wholesale price.
The prices for Dassa were first de-shifted by zero–mean deterministic terms taking out the shifts in their sample
mean at observations 73, 80, 81 and 136.
* Indicates significantly different from zero when compared with the 5% critical value. The critical values
have been obtained from MacKinnon et al. (1999, Case I, k= 0), see also Osterwald-Lenum (1992, Table 0), and
are 12.32 if rV 0 and 4.13 if rV 1.
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models. The estimates of the adjustment parameters are presented in Table 3 and
appear to be in favor of our hypotheses, in particular if one compares the t-values
with the Dickey–Fuller critical values (cf. Schotman, 1989) which, in absolute terms,Table 3
Testing for long-run causality between the retail price series and the wholesale price series of the corresponding
market
Market Effective sample Estimate Estimate
size ar Standard error t value aw Standard error t value
Cotonou 180  0.41* 0.07  6.20 0.09 0.05 1.98
100  0.76* 0.11  7.20 0.06 0.07 0.94
Bohicon 150  0.34* 0.05  6.53  0.03 0.06  0.58
100  0.28* 0.07  3.79 0.03 0.06 0.64
Azove´ 174  0.17 0.09  1.99 0.50* 0.09 5.81
100 0.14 0.11 1.33 0.80* 0.11 7.42
Dassa 164  0.10 0.18  0.54 0.48* 0.17 2.91
100  0.04 0.15  0.28 0.42* 0.13 3.24
Ke´tou 134  0.62* 0.08  7.50 0.07 0.05 1.33
100  0.41* 0.08  5.35 0.02 0.06 0.37
The second sample for each market consists of the last 100 observations of the first sample.
ar is the coefficient of er,t 1, that is, the error correction term (see Table 2), in the equation for Dprt and aw is the
coefficient of er,t 1 in the equation for Dpwt.
* Indicates significantly different from zero (one-sided t-test at the 0.01 level).
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approximation, we applied a one-sided t-test at the 0.01 level instead of the 0.05 one.
Model 2, implying that retailers dominate the wholesalers and are able to exercise
some monopolistic behavior, applies to Cotonou, Bohicon and Ke´tou, because prt is
error correcting, (ar is significant and lies within  2 and 0) and pwt is not (aw is
insignificant). The results for Azove´ and Dassa according to which pwt is error
correcting (aw is significant and lies within 0 and 2) and prt is not (ar is insignificant),
comply with Model 3, indicating that there is a direct link between the retail price and
the farm-gate price, while the wholesalers are able to be involved in market arbitrage,
leaving them some leeway to influence wholesale prices.
In the cointegrating relationships in Table 2, we see that the parameter of the
wholesale price is greater than one in all markets, complying, given the Models we
concluded to apply, with the set of restrictions { 1 < d < 0^si>0^xi = 0biaN}. Finally,
notice that although the parameter of the wholesale price of Ke´tou is greater than one,
it is, in contrast to the other markets, not significantly so, confirming our observation
that most consumers in Ke´tou buy directly from the farmers or are farmers
themselves.5. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a method for empirically testing whether or not
wholesalers have some price setting power vis-a`-vis the retailers. The method was
applied to three models that were considered possible candidates for describing the
vertical price relationships in the marketing channels of local maize markets in Benin.
A salient feature of our method is that the common stochastic trend and the deviations
from the long-run vertical price equilibrium must be assigned to the variables in each
model being considered. Doing this for the application in this paper, we found that the
exclusion restrictions on the error–correction structure led to testable implications
discriminating between the three models.
As far as our limited evidence goes, we conclude that retailers do not allow
wholesalers to behave as vertical price leaders in the sense of Stackelberg leadership,
unless the wholesalers are involved in market arbitrage. In fact, in the towns
wholesalers do not have alternative market opportunities and retailers dominate the
local market price formation process. In Ke´tou, the few retailers that exist seem to be
able to exploit some opportunities for monopolistic competition. In the two larger rural
centers considered in this study, Dassa and Azove´, wholesalers dominate: retail prices
are stuck to the stochastic trend, while wholesalers have alternative arbitrage
opportunities, giving them some freedom to influence prices.
Our empirical results indicate that relations between wholesalers and retailers vary
between market places. In contrast to common assumption in development studies,
retailers play a crucial role in the price formation process. Local market conditions are
decisive in the distribution of market power among retailers and wholesalers.
Consequently, the statement ‘the retail market segment is dominated by the wholesale
segment’ needs to be tested, before it is imposed as an assumption on a model.
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